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Hobbes, Formalism, and 
Corrective Justice 
Anita L. Allen* and i'vfm-ia H. Morales** 
lNTRODCCTION 
A.  Recent Theories of Corrective Justice 
In the United States , courts offer what appear to be both corrective 
justice and distributive justice. rationales for their decisions in personal 
injury cases. In Becker v. Interst(J.te, for instance, a federal court's appeal to 
distributive justice was explicit.' As a practical matter, corrective justice and 
distributive justice rationales coexist in the body of cases lawyers commonly 
refer to as "tort law." Professor Ernest Weinrib suggests, however, that tort 
law is fundamentally a matter of corrective rather than distributive justice.2 
His starting point is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.3 
According to Weinrib, "[t]he strength of Aristotle's treatment of justice 
lies in the very differentiation between corrective and distributive justice. "4 
Moreover, "in distinguishing these two forms of justice, Aristotle sets out 
the justificatory structures to which any coherent legal arrangement must 
conform."" Weinrib seeks to illuminate the moral foundations of tort law bv 
appeal to a formal, Aristotelian conception of corrective justice, suppl�-
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., New College , 1974 ; l\l.A .. 
Ph.D., Lniversity of Michigan, 1979; JD., Harvard Law School. 1984. 
''*Assistant Professor of Philosophy. Florida State Cniversity. B.A., Uni\·ersitv of .\1ardand, 
1987; Ph.D .. l'niversity of Pennsvlvania, 1992. 
l .  Becker \·. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding real estate 
developer liable for negligence of undercapitalized sub-contractor (citing .\L0estic Reality 
Assocs .. Inc.\'. Toti Contracting Co., 153 .\.2d 321, 325 (N.J 1959)) ("The contractee, true, 
has no control over the doing of the work and in that sense is also innocent of the wrongdoing; 
but he does ha\·e the power of selection and in the application of concepts of distributive 
justice perhaps much can be said for the view that a loss arising out of the tortious conduct of 
a financialh irresponsible contractor should fall on the contractee. ") . Thus, the Becker court 
did not limit itself to a fault-oriented corrective justice analysis. It also undertook a no-fault or 
strict liabili t; distributi\·e justice analysis, inquiring whether de\eloper liability would effi­
ciently spread costs , promote safet)', and place burdens on those who benefl[ from the 
injurv-causing acti\·ity . Becker, 569 F.2d at 1209-12. 
2. See generally Ernest \Neinrib, Arisrotle's Forms of justice, 2 Rat. .Jur. 211 ( 1989): Ernest 
\\'einrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 407 (1987) : Ernest \\'einrib. Ln,· 
as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L Re\. 472 (1987): Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: 
On the I mmaneni Rationality of Law, 97 Yale LJ. 949 ( 1988) [hereinafter Legal Formalism]: 
Ernest 'v\'einrib, The Special \!orality ofT on Law, 34 \lcGill LJ 403 ( 1989); Ernest Weinrib. 
To\,•ard a '.!oral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & PhiL 37 (1983) ; Ernest \Veinrib, 
l'nderstancling Tort law. 23 VaL U. L Rev 485 (1989). 
3. ,-\ristotle. The �ichomachean Ethics (Sir Da\·id Ross trans., Oxford 1975). 
4. Ernest Weinrib, Correcti\'e justice, 77 Iowa L Re\. 405, 412 (1991). 
5. ld at 413. 
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mented by s u bstantive K an tian and H egelian u nderstandings o f  m oral 
equ ality . On Wein rib's account, corrective j ustice restores the ex ante moral 
equality owed free,  ration al agents as a matter of n atural right .  "At the time 
of the defendan t's actio ns ," Weinrib maintains,  "hi s  enri chment consists in 
the excessive freedom o f  acting u nconstrained by the obligation to respect  
the plaintiffs right."6 C o nsequently ,  whe n  the defendan t's act  mate rializes 
in to inj urv, the in j u ry itself becomes a measure of the defe n d an t's  surplus  
freedom.7 More than serving as an "amoral heuristic device ," for vVeinrib, 
corre CLive justice partakes of the stringen t Kantian and H egelian n orma­
tiveness that consists in m aking the actor conform to the abstract s tructu re 
of 1dliag.8  Kant and H egel "show that corrective justice i s  a necessary 
implication of free will .  "9 
v\'einrib's perspectives are in some respects idiosyncratic . Yet other 
leading scholars main tain that correc tive j us tice is the moral fou n d ation of 
tort l aw and their theories bear generically Aristotel ian and K an tian s tamps . 
\·Vhile not e xpressly taking the texts of A ristotle or Kan t as h is s tarting 
places ,  Professor J u les  Coleman holds views simil ar to Wei n rib's in key 
respects .10 
Like \Vein rib , Cole m an rel ies on an " Aristotelian" distin ct io n  betwee n  
corrective and distributive justice,  and o n  a " K an tian" substan tive, m oral 
r ights-based understanding of wron gdoers '  gains as correl ative to their 
\ ictims' losse s .  Like Weinrib, Coleman believes that principles  o f  correc tive 
j ust ice are , and should be, applied in appropriate personal injury cases . 
Like \Veinrib , Coleman believes that corrective j ustice "mav, as a c o nse­
q uence of meetin g  its demands ,  reestablish or defe n d  distributive 
inj u s tices."11 
Against a background of distinguis h ing between "pure relatio n al "  and 
"pure ann u l me nt" conceptions of correcti\·e j us tice, Coleman describes his 
own con ception as "mixed ."1� Relational conceptions  provide that, in vie w  
of personal wron gdoing, o n e  in curs certain obligations of reparatio n  or 
compensa tion toward one's \·ictims th at gi\·e one a reas o n  for acting .  
_--\ n n ul m e nt conce ptions of corrective j u s tice maintain that wron gful gains 
li. Ernest \\'e111rib. C:orreClin: .Justice �12 (unpublished manuscript, conference draft 
l �I() I ). 
'· Id. at 61-i. 
�'- ld. ar 67. 
�1. \\'ein rib . Correcti1·e Justice, supra note-!. at-!�-!. 
IU. Src gcnl'mil'l Jules Colcl11an, \!arkets. \!orals and the Law 166-201 (J()f\8): Jeffre' 
\lurph1· & Jules C:c•lcman. The Philosupl11' of L111: .-\n IntroduGion to Jurisprudence 1 Gl-89 
! 1'1�-!i: Jules Coleman . .Justice <l!ld the .-\rgument for :\o-fault, 3 Soc. Theon· & Prac. lbl 
( 1'17-!�:Jules Coleman. \lmal Theories of Tons: Their Scope and Limits: Pan I. 1 Ln,· & PhiL 
:.\71 (I L):)2) [hereinafter \k•r:tl Theories of Torrs : Pan II: .Jules Coleman, \!oral " rheor i es <Jf 
Tnrh: Their Scope and !.imit;;: Part II. 2 Lm & Phil.:) (I DS3) [hereinafter \!oral Theories of 
Tons: Pan Ill. jules e_:.,]eman. Prupert1. \\.rongfulness and the Dut1· to Compensate, 63 
Chi.-1\.cnt L Re1 -Li 1 \1 �lS/1: .Jule.s Coleman. The Siructure of Tort La11·, 97 \'ale L.J. I �33 
i l �L�X). 
II . .  Jul es L. Coleman,.-\ \li:-:ed Cn tt ccptio n of Correcti1·e Justice. 77 IU11a L. Re1·. at -!2/, 
-129 11991:. 
1:!. !d. at 437--11. 
"
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and losses ought to be eliminated through reparation or compensatio n .  
Coleman formerly advanced a p u re ann u l m e n t  conception of corrective 
j ustice which provided only that some person or institutio n  ought to ann u l  
wron gful gains and losses . 1'1 Coleman n o w  concedes t o  Weinrib, R ic h ard 
Epstein,  and others that an inherent moral relationship exists between 
inj u rers and the \·ictims they wron g.14 
Coleman's revised theory, h is sel f-described "mixed conception "  of 
correct ive j ustice ,  combines e l e ments of the p u re an n u l me n t  and the p ure 
rel ational conceptio n _�'> Wrongdoers ,  defined as those who v iol ate others' 
rights , h ave a duty to repair the \vron gful losses their conduct occas io n s .  
Thus,  u nder Coleman 's mixed conceptio n ,  wrongdoers h ave relat ional 
reasons for acting to ann u l  the losses for which they are responsible .  
Coleman claims that retrib utive j ustice pertains to the duty of wron gdoers 
to rectify the ir wrongs by s u b mitting to p u n is hmen t. 1 6  By contrast,  he 
c laims that corrective j ustice pert ains to wron gdoers' d u ties to rectify losses 
occas ioned by their wrongs .  /·.,. simil ar distinction between p aying the 
victims of one's offense and s ubmitting to p u n is h me n t  for o ne 's offenses 
mav be found in Thomas H obbes' Leviathan: "[I]f the l aw imposes a s u m  of 
money to be p aid , to h im that h as been inj ured; this is  but  a satisfaction for 
the hurt clone h im; and extin g u is heth the accusation of the p arty inj ur e d ,  
n o t  t h e  crime o f  the offender." 17 
I n  espousing a partial ly  rel atio n al ,  or mixed, conception of corrective 
j u stice ,  Coleman h as not abandoned his signature distin ction between the 
gro unds of rectification and the mode of rectificatio n . 18 He continues to 
deny that "A wrongful ly  injured B" entails th at "A. ought to rectify B's loss ."  
Coleman argues that wh ile A's inj u ring B provides the gro u nd for B's 
rectification,  it does not fol low that A.' s  repairing or compen s atin g  R is 
therefore the mode of rectification requ ired by j ustice . According to 
Coleman , "E\en if the injurer h as the d u tv to rep air inj ustice ,  it does not 
fol low that justice requ ires that the dutv be d ischarged by the inj urer."'�"� 
Coleman maint ains that victims acqu ire rights to repay ment, normatively 
e n tailed by their inj urers '  correlati ve obligations, and inj urers acq u ire 
normative reasons for acting to rectify .  The ide al of corrective justice ,  
however, dictates no u n iq u e  instit utio nal mechan isms for dischargin g  
wrongdoers' obligatio n s .  A wrongdoer's obligations  could b e  j ustly d is­
charged by a distributional ly  just social insurance scheme ,  Coleman sug­
gests . 
13. Id. at -±29-3�) 
14. E.g . . Richard Epstein. Nuisance: Conccti\'C Justice <mel Its Ltilitarian Constraints, H 
J. Legal Stud. 49 (197Cl). 
15 Coleman, suprJ note 11. at 437-41. 
16. lcl. at 442. 
17. Thomas Hobbes. Le\ iathan: or the '\latter, Forme. and Po\,·er of Commonwealth 
Ecclesiastical and Ci,·il 232 (.\lichael Dakshort eel, Collier .\lacmillian Publishers 1962) (1651). 
18. See gencralh· Coleman's explication of th..: distinct ion ben,·een grounds and mode of 
rectification in Coleman, \lora! Theories of Tons: Pan !, supra note 10; Co leman . .\lora! 
-rheuries of Tons: Pan l I, supra note 1 0: Coleman, The Structure of Ton La\\', supra note I 0. 
:ia also Coleman. i\brkets. \lor�ds and the La11·. supra note I 0. 
19. Coleman, supra note 11, at 443. 
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B. The Hobbesian Alternative 
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The philosophic perspectives of vVeinrib and Coleman on corrective 
justice are far from identical. They differ both in broad aspect and in detail. 
However, both perspectives assume that ajust legal order would recognize 
distributive and corrective justice. In addition, notwithstanding Coleman's 
distinction between the grounds and mode of rectification, both perspec­
tives assume that a just legal order would treat corrective justice as a matter 
of rights and duties between specific injurers, presumablv tonfeasors, and 
their victims. Scholars interested in the development of western legal 
thought may be interested to note that the legal philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes, one of the seminal figures of modern legal philosoph\, appears to 
embrace neither of these salient assumptions. 
The vision of political order that Hobbes presented in his monumental 
Leviathan importantly included a vision of the law.�'' This essay will recount 
Hobbes' legal vision, highlighting the conceptions of justice it embodies. In 
part, our aim is historical exegesis. Hobbes' theory of law included a 
conception of distributive laws and distributive justice. But it did not 
include, at least not obviously, a separate theorv of corrective justice.:21 v\'e 
set forth Hobbes' legal vision in some detail to lav bare the structure that 
enabled him to reject notions about corrective justice that manv theorists 
today readily assume. 
In place of the classic Aristotelian distinction between correnive and 
distributive justice,22 Hobbes explicitly substituted a distinction between 
commutative and distributive justice. The former pertains to keeping one's 
covenants, the latter to the allocation of goods and liberties. Hobbes' theory 
suggests that what is often called "corrective" justice is onlv a contingent, 
heuristic aspect of a system of just distribution. \Ve believe that an 
examination of Hobbes' philosophv of law can potentially illuminate 
current discussion of the moral foundations of tort law. His was the 
philosophy of a legal formalist and rule positivist who e�presslv rejected 
central aspects of the Aristotelian analysis of justice that some present-day 
scholars readilv embrace. We do not hold up Hobbes' legal philosophv as a 
model. However, his ideas underscore the need to take seriouslv theories of 
justice that reject responses to personal injury premised on tl�e supposed 
demands of corrective justice. 
Identifying Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant as two philosophers 
influenced by what he regards as Aristotle's problematic analysis ofjustice. 
Richard Posner has observed with regret that "there has been little 
discussion of corrective justice bv philosc)phers. ctnc! the concept remains 
essentiallv where Aristotle left it."2:1 Posner has not mention Hobbes' effort 
' 
to modify the Aristotelian analysis of justice. Indeed, legal scholars ha\e 
20. Hobbes. supra nore 17, at 129-26 l 
21. This Essa,· uses ··correctiYe," ··compens::non·,·· :·llld ··rcniiic::uun· as ''nunnns. 
Sometimes ··repair·· "·ill be used to indicate recrificz1tion in kind :1nd ··,umpensate·· 1;, indicate 
moneran recrificatinn. 
22. See .-\ristotle, supra note 3, Book 5. at 1 1 2-21: ,p,, gl'llrm/ly \\.cimib . .  \rist�>t!c"s Fornb 
of Justice, supra nme 2. 
23. Richard Posner, The Problems \Jfjurispruclence :l2:l :1.ll i,lCJ�I()) 
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paid little attention to the details of Hobbes' discussion of justice, though 
thev frequently rnention his social contract theory and his definition of law 
as the sovereign's commands.24 Consequently, Hobbes' rejection of correc­
ti\ e justice (other than in the context of contract law) has gone \·inually 
uno:amined. 
This Essay will demonstrate that Hobbes' legal theory is, surprisingly, 
a distant cousin both of Posner's anti-Aristotelianism and of Weinrib's 
neo-Aristotelianism. Influenced by Weinrib's theories, contemporary dis­
cussions of the moral foundations of tort law seem to presuppose that 
formalist and corrective justice approaches to personal injury are insepa­
rable. Hobbes' legal theory deserves attention, in part, to help underscore 
the point that formalism and corrective justice are separable. Pan I of this 
Essa�· will lav out Hobbes' theory of legal justice to show its distinct 
positi\ism, formalism, and avoidance of Aristotle's corrective justice. Pan II 
will consider Hobbes' theory in relation to recent debates. 
I. HoBBEs ON JesT ICE 
Hobbes· theory of justice is inseparable from his theory of law. "[L]aws 
are rhe rules of just, and unjust," Hobbes asserted, "nothing being reputed 
unjust that is not contrary to some law."25 Hobbes' theory of law is a 
structural beam in the edifice of a contractarian political theory of the 
··forme [sic] and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil."26 
A. Natural Law 
The political theorv of the Leviathan is familiar terrain to political 
theorists. According to Hobbes, the natural condition of humankind is a 
cunditiun of war.27 \!inually equal in body, mind, and hope, human beings 
in a state of nature will employ violence to gain and defend power, 
possessions, and reputation. So conceived, the natural predicament of 
hunnnit\ is the ··war of every man, against every man."2" Two dispositions 
incline rational, self-interested human individuals to seek peace. First, they 
fear death. Second, they desire necessities, comforts, and the fruits of 
personal industrY.�'· To escape the perils of violent competition among 
equals O\er resources and social standing, individuals seek the protection of 
a common power or SOYereign who can "over-awe them all.''3'1 To escape a 
!if� th<tt is ··solicary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,"'li rational persons will 
compact to form a cornmomvealth in which they all are subject to a single 
SO\ereigll \\ith absolute political authority and the ability to maintain peace. 
:!·1. L.g. iri. :rt 1 1. l �l. l :J l, l 7�. 3'-10. 
:!:-). HI.JOht.':-i. ·"Uj)l'l! 110[(' I/, �It 1�18. 
:!<i. !d. at tiJrnurnbcrcd title p:1gc. 
��- Id. Jt ���-�.>9. 
�0. !d. :tt ! l.iU-0 I .  
2�1. !d. :rr i I r:Z. 
�1U. f d. a� cl'i 
�) l. 1 d. �tt I ( l( l. 
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Hobbes maintained that reason dictates ceding all natural liberty­
short of the liberty of self-preservation against direct threats-to a might\ 
commonwealth. He identified nineteen "natural laws," also termed "com­
mands of God" and "moral virtues," conformity to which is called for bv 
rational self-presen-ation.:>? He defined a natural law as '·a precept or 
general rule, found out by reason, b;· which a man is forbidden to do that, 
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the 
same; and omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best presened.":'3 
Hobbes' first law of nature is that "naturally every man has a right to 
everything."34 The second is that "a man be willing, when others are so too, 
as far-forth, as for peace, and defence [sic] of himself and be contented \\·ith 
so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himself."35 His third is the "fountain and original of JUSTIC£,"lti that 
"men perform their co\·enants macle."'�7 Other laws of nature include 
gratitude, mutual accommodation, equitv, the facility to pardon. equal use 
of indivisible common goods, arbitrary division by lot of common goods 
that cannot be shared, safekeeping of mediators, submission to the judg­
ment of arbitrators, and judicial impartiality. Still other laws of narure 
proscribe pride, contumely, arrogance, and retribution or re,·enge that 
looks at the "greatness of the evil past" rather than at the "greatness of the 
good to follow.""" Hobbes summed up the prescriptive thrust of the 
nineteen natural laws in one simple formula described as ·'intellig-ent e\·en 
to the meanest capacity" and thus properh' binding all: "Do ncJt that to 
another, which thou wou!dest not ha,·e done to th\'self.'':l'' 
B. Positiz•e Lnw 
The details of the theorv of law set forth in the Ln•iatlwn are less well 
known than their contractarian political underpinnings. Hobbes main­
tained that the rational demands of natural law impel human beings toward 
the formation of mutually ad,·anrageous positive ci\·il law. The Hobbesian 
laws of nature are ·'articles of peace" that reason suggests, whereb 
individuals may come to an agreement to order socier:· in a peaceful state. 
Products of reason rather than sovereigntv. thev are ·:laws" onlv i n a 
derivative sense. Ci\·il law, or law properlv so-called, is the will of the 
sovereign ruler: 
CIVIL LAW is to every subject. those rules, which the common­
wealth hath commanded him, bv word, bv wr iting. or other 
sufficient sign of will, to make use of, for the distinc tion of right, 
and wrong; that is to sav, of \\·hat is contrar\, and what is not 
32. !d. at 103-2� 
33. ld. at 103. 
34. !d. (emphasis omitted)_ 
35. lcL at 104 (emphasis umirtcd). 
36. !d. at 113. 
r I. !d. (emphasis "mirtedi. 
38. !d. at 1 19. 
39. !d. at 122. 
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contrary to the rule:10 
The sovereign's civil laws define "[g]ood, evil, lawful and unlawful," as well 
as "the rules of propriety, or meum and tuum."41 Moreover, the sovereign's 
laws define justice and injustice in the commonwealth.42 Hobbes' first and 
primary definition of justice makes justice a feature of all laws that issue 
from the sovereign will. 
In Hobbes' view, justice depends upon a SO\ereign's positive rule. Yet 
the third law of nature appears to introduce a different account of justice 
that anticipates, rather than depends upon, the existence of ruies of positive 
law: "[W]hen a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust. The definition 
of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And 
whatsoever is not unjust, is just."43 The ideal of justice reflected in Hobbes' 
third law of nature seems to be logically prior to the practical justice which 
the positive law generates. Hobbes' second definition of justice, the 
performance of covenants, makes no reference to a sovereign's commands. 
So, it appears that even in the state of nature individuals could create rights 
and obligations through private covenants, the performance or nonperfor­
mance of which would define a kind of justice and injustice. In the absence 
of the civil commonwealth, individuals possess the natural libeny to, in 
effect, make their own "law." Individuals can create rights and obligations 
through private covenants which define a kind of natural justice and 
injustice. 
Hobbes' third law of nature raises several pressing questions concern­
ing his theory of justice. First, is there room in Hobbes' account for talking 
about justice independently of a commonwealth? Second. what is the 
connection between Hobbes' first and second definitions of justice:; Finally, 
can we son through the two definitional strands in Hobbes' argument to 
yield a coherent account of justice:, It is not our aim here to offer a 
definitive solution to these interpretive queries. However, we suggest that 
these difficulties in Hobbes' account arise at least ii1 part from his own use 
of the terms "natural" and "nature." The role of natural law in Hobbes' 
theory is closely linked w his argument for the creation and legitimacv of 
the state. Hobbes linked the effectiveness of the laws of nature with the 
existence of certain social background conditions, notablv, with the e:-;.ist­
ence of laws properly so-called. Subjects mav not appeal to natural law to 
justify their noncompliance with the positi\·e justice entailed b: civil law, no 
matter what the content of civil law might be. All that justice viewed as a law 
of nature requires is conformity to reason. ":--latural" nu'ans conformable to 
reason.H Reason dictates that persons seek to escape the condition of war 
bv participating in the creation of a mode of political organization condu­
cive to peace.43 Justice thus requ ires making anc! keeping compacts 
-10. !d. at Ll8 (emphasis omitted) . 
.fl. I d. 
-!2. !d. at 198. 
-!3. !d. at 113 (emphasis omitted). 
H. !d. at 116-!7. 
-!5. As Gregon· K;wka points om, the laws of nature must ha'c binding force i!l what he 
calls the .. attenuated" state of nature. See Gregon- Ka,·ka. Hobbesian \,!"r;d C�!id Political 
-
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conducive to peace, and a fortiori making and keeping a social compact that 
will invest a sovereign with unfettered powers. Finally, keeping the social 
compact entails obeying the sovereign's rules of law defining justice and 
injustice. 
The conventional character of Hobbes' theory of justice has contrib­
uted to its infamy. Hobbes required that we label even intolerant laws 'just" 
if they in fact function to keep peace. Hobbes distinguished between the 
justice of laws and the goodness of laws. The goodness of laws depends on 
their promoting individuals' fundamental interests consistently with the 
laws of nature. Although Hobbes allowed for the existence of bad laws, the 
badness of laws does not affect their status as laws and hence their status as 
just. But Hobbes' distinction between just and good laws raises a problem. 
Imagine a commonwealth in which a privileged minority enjoys the benefits 
of community life, while the majority is subordinated to it by coercion. The 
repressive sovereign regime persistently issues civil laws favoring the 
privileged group at the expense of other subjects. Hobbes gave no 
indication of how much tyranny would spark war and return a people to the 
state of nature. He implied, however, that if the subordinated subjects of 
the commonwealth we are imagining could not dispose of the sovereign 
without instigating discord of uncertain proportions and duration, rational 
self-preservation would dictate continued tolerance of the intolerant, 'just" 
order. Given that the sovereign defines moral terms through its legislative 
activity, subjects cannot judge that the commonwealth's laws are bad. 
Rational people would prefer a "bad" interpretation of the laws of nature to 
many conflicting ones that might lead them back to the state of nature. It 
might not be wholly in the subjects' interest to obev the sovereign, but it 
mav be more rational than to disobey the sovereign. thereby risking the 
dissolution of the commonwealth. 
Moreover. the interpretation of the laws of nature alwavs rests with the 
sovereign and its agents. The "interpretation of all laws dependeth on the 
authority sovereign; and the interpreters can be none but those, which the 
so\ereign, to whom only the subject oweth obedience. shall appoint."4t; The 
subjects have scant power to challenge an "incorrect" interpretation of the 
laws of nature. They cannot even judge whether the sovereign's interpre­
tation is correct. It is likely that in a Hobbesian world people's capacity to 
reflect and to challenge established institutions would be seriouslv weak­
ened, or at least that competing conceptions of justice would \\"ither away 
from disuse and inefficiency. 
The<)n \ l9tHi). Other\\'ise, the transition to ci1i! socict\ ''oulcl be impossible. Bul the seiise in 
11hich the la11·s of nature are binding in ,,·hat Kad:.a calls the "unadulterated" state of nawre, 
the re:�l hr/lwn Ollllli's contra umnuun. is obscure. :\t most. the la11·s uf n:�turc 111 that state r·clllld 
sen·c as precepts for personal moraiitv 11·ithin Hobbes' "natural" lllStillltions (such as the 
Lunilv). :\onethelcss. the clailll th:�t the laws of ll<Iture bind indi1iduals in the attenuated state 
of nature points to the transitionJ.I character of Hobbes' legal positi1ism . 
.J:6. Hobbes, supra note 17. at 205. 
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C. Formalism and Adjudication 
For H obbes , the positive legal norms of sovereign commonwealths are 
the formal framework for adj udication .  Thus,  Hobbes asserted that the 
good judge wil l  take notice of  fact only from witnesses and of law only from 
the statutes,  constitutions a n d  declarations of the sovereign . Legal adjudi­
cat ion is  a process of rule  a p p li cation in  H obbes,  b u t  rule  application of a 
special sort. I t  is "veri ficati o n . "47 Judges say what i s  truly law a n d  what  law 
truh demands .4� 
Yet,  for H obbes, law- however s i mply expressed and whether wri tten 
or u nwritten - requires i n terpre tatio n .  H obbesian i n terpretation consists of 
" 'the appl ication of the law to t h e  present  case . "49 I t  is guided by t h e  i n te n t  
o f  the sovereign , t o  whose l ips  every court must  chain i t s  ears.  H owever, 
where the i ntent of the sovereign legislator is  i nexplicit ,  u nclear, con tradic­
tor)' , or seemi ngly i niquitous ,  a j udge properly relies u pon natural  l a w ,  and 
i n  particular,  the natural law of equity .50 U nder the terms o f  H obbes' 
theory ,  n e i ther the require m e n t  of j udicial i nterpretation nor the permis­
s ibi l i ty of j udicial  appeal to natural law breaches legal formal i ty .  H obbes 
implied that,  to the exten t  that sovereigns possess effective powers and 
j udges possess virtues of r ight  reason and impartial i ty , 5 1  the formal 
integrity of law as a system of peace-keepin g  rules is  not  threatened by 
polit ics ,  real ism , pragmatism,  j udicial act ivism or other (anachron isticaliy 
phrased) instrumentalist vices.  
1 .  Reciprocal Conta inment 
Modern legal t heories from H obbes' to H . L . A .  H art's face what m i gh t  
b e  cal led " t h e  realist chal lenge . "  The realist challenge is  t o  g i v e  an accou nt  
of the law that  adequately dist inguishes law from politics : fin d i n g  the law 
(adj udicati o n ) ,  from maki n g  the law ( legislation).  H obbes' formalist  solu­
tion to the problem of real ism featured his  ' ·reciprocal conta inment" thesis .  
For H obbes , a law of natu re i s  a ge neral rule d iscoverable b y  reason and 
d i rected at procurin g  the means for self-preservation . I n  contrast ,  he 
defi ned c iv i l  law as "those rules,  which the commonwealth hath com­
manded [nerv subject] by word, or writ ing,  or other suffic ie n t  s ign of the 
w i l l ,  to m a ke use of, for the dist inct ion of rights,  and wro n g ;  that i s  to say, 
-1 7 .  I d .  at �0-1. 
-I S .  l ei a t  �()tJ. 
-19. l ei .  ar �06. 
:)0.  I d.  at � 0�1 . 
:) I .  Sa ic! .  at � I ()  Hubbes stated : 
The t h i n gs that m:tke a gcmd _j udgc.  or a good interpreter of l a,, s ,  arc . first. u tigh t 
undcntanrling uf tku p r incipal Ia\\ of n arure cal led cqu i t ,  . . . . . Seco n d .  c u n t e m p t  of 
u n necess:-�n r iches, and prefermen ts .  Thirclll·. to be able in judgment to di 1·est 
h i mself of a l l  fear. anger. hatred. lo1·e. and compass ion .  FourthlY, and lastly ,  patience 
to hear: cli !igem . H t em i on in heari ng:  and memon· to reta i n ,  digest ,  and apph· "·hat 
he hath h eard . 
l ei .  
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of what i s  contrary, and what i s  not contrary t o  the rule. "52 The "reciprocal 
containment" thesis is a concise statement of Hobbes' views on the relation 
between natural and civil law. As developed, the laws of nature are general 
rules discoverable by reason and directed at procuring the best means for 
self-preservation. Civil laws are the sovereign's commands , which define 
right and wrong. Hobbes nonetheless argued that "[t]he law of nature, and 
the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal extent." 53 He drew the 
puzzling conclusion that "the law of nature therefore is . . .  a part of the civil 
law in all commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the civil la\v is a 
part of the dictates of nature."54 What could Hobbes have meant? 
According to Weinrib, " [L]egal formalism claims that juridical rela­
tionships can be understood as embodying,  in [ Roberto] U nger's phrase, an 
'immanent moral rationality. " '55 Moreover, "[t]he positive law is imma­
nently rational to the extent that it  captures and reflects the contours of 
rationality that are internal to the relationships that law governs."51) 
Problematically, Hobbes appears to have maintained that positive law is 
immanently rational to the fullest extent. By virtue of his reciprocal 
containment thesis , Hobbes' formalism is a distant cousin of Weinrib's. 
a. Positive law in the natu ra l law 
The first premise of Hobbes' reciprocal containment thesis is that the law 
of nature is contained in the positive civil law. The second premise,  which we 
will seek to elucidate first, is that the positive civil law is contained in the law of 
nature. The second part of the reciprocal containment thesis could mean at 
least two things. First,  i t  could mean that the laws of nature rationally and 
morally mandate the institution of a commonwealth and, a fortiori, ci\·il laws 
for the protection of individuals' fundamental interests in a peaceful, cooper­
ative social life. Second, ic could mean that the laws of nature contain certain 
basic rational and moral precepts that are to function as guidelines for the 
sovereign's legislation. vVe will refer to the first as the "contractarian'' inter­
pretation and to the second as the "minimu m  content" interpretation. 
According to the contractarian interpretation of the assertion that the 
civil law is contained in the law of nature, the laws of nature presu ppose the 
conditions that make civil law possible. The contractarian meaning has two 
shortcomings. First, it shares the weaknesses of Hobbes'  social contract 
theory generally. ''' Yet, for Hobbes .  the social contract is only one means of 
justifying the origin and legitimacy of the state . He distinguished between 
commonwealths by institution, contract ually created, and com monwealths 
by acquisition, created by force. In both cases indi\ iduals are bound w obey 
the sovereign, whose powers are absol ute. F u rthermore , the m otivation for 
5 2 .  l d .  at 1 98 .  
5 3 .  l d .  at  1 99.  
54 .  ld .  
5 5 .  \Nei nrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 2 ,  at  95 7 .  
S 6 .  ! d .  a t  9 5 7  n .26 .  
J 1 .  See generally Jean H a m p ton , H obbes and the Social Con tract Tradi t ion ( 1 98 6 )  
(employin g  game theory and decis ion theory to cri t ique H obbes' psyclwlog,· a n d  pol i t i cs ) .  
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obedience is a lways t h e  s a m e ,  fear of death,  e i ther in t h e  h a n d s  o f  one 
another ( i n  the s tate of nature)  or i n  the hands o f  the sovereign conqueror. 
The notion of the social con tract defi n es the terms for mutual ly  advanta­
geous cooperat i o n ,  but so does obedience to a conqueror. As a resu l t ,  the 
contractarian i nt erpretation cannot explain the conditions that make ci"i l  
la1\ possible in commonwealths  by acqu isitio n .  
The secon d  shortcomi n g  o f  the contractarian interpretation i s  t h a t  i t  
cannot adequ a tely  explain t h e  sense i n  which t h e  whole o f  civ i l  law- down 
to the most technical statutory provisions - can be contained in the laws of 
nature.  
The "minimu m content" rendering of the first pan of the reciprocal 
coma i n ment thesis is more promi s i n g .  On this i n terpre tatio n ,  the l a ws of 
nature pro\·ide that civ i l  legislation must incorporate basic n atural  l a w  if it 
is to sene its p urpose of keeping i nd iv id uals  out o f  the state o f  natu re .  So, 
for example,  al l  commo n wealths should have l a ws for e ncouraging coop­
e ra t i o n ,  for accord i n g  others equal rights, for d i viding resources equal ly or 
fa irly,  and for settl i n g  disputes by fair arbitration (As we shall  see,  a l though 
o n e  might  s u p pose that rules of corrective j ustice wou l d  be requisite 
" m i n i m u m  content ,"  H obbes did not specify rules for rect ify i n g  losses 
stem ming from personal  inj u ry in the Let'iatha n .  He did, h owever, e n u mer­
ate and rank order common crimi n a l  offenses and identify conditions that 
excuse criminal  acts . )  
T h e  mi nimu m coment in terpretation makes H obbes' reciprocal thesis 
;md H . L . A .  Han's argume nt for the " mi n i mum conte n t  of n atural l aw" 
prac t i ca l l y  paral le l  in both aim and content .  [n The Concept of Law , H an 
argu es that  the  m ain difference between moral criticism in terms o f  j ustice 
a n d  other n pes of moral crit icism is that the former is more specifi c .  58 
Crit ic i sm in terms of justice is connected to the notion of fairness .  
The leading precept in the idea of justice is  to ' ' treat l i ke cases a l i ke and 
treat.  d i fferent cases different ly ."59 This precept has two noteworthy 
features :  a u n i form and a s h ift i n g  criterio n .  The u niform criterion is the 
precept's for m al aspect. which remain s  · 'an empty form" un til fi l led in . Th e 
s h i ft i n g  cri te rio n is the fi l l i n g  i n  of the precept bv determin in g  wha t  makes 
case-; ,d i ke : < r1cl \\·hat d i fferences are releva n t .  These determinations are 
necessary for the cri tic ism of law as u nj u s t .  I mpart ia l ity in the a p p l ication o f  
l a w  to panicu lar cases i s  not  sufficie n t :  an u nj us t  law may b e  j ust ly 
ad m i n i s t ered Y )  T h e  law i tse lf  can not p rovide the criteria for establish i n g  
l\·har si m i larities a n d  d i fferences a m o n g  individuals  are relevant  t o  the 
cr i t ic ism of law as unj u s t 6 1 For these cri teria ,  an appeal to valuative 
ccmside ratio ns  outside the legal  system is n ecessary . 
. ·\cco:·d ing to H art, the distributi\·e application of the notion of j ustice, 
· ·r.he mos1 ;_;ubl ic and t he most l egal of the vinues,"1'2 gives it  s pecial rele\·ance 
:, .-: . H . L . \ .  H a rt .  The Concept of Lm 1 5'-1 ( ! 96 1 ) . 
j� "i _  i. d .  :lt l �1 5 .  
lit i .  i c l .  < l  [ l 5 1 )  
: i ::! .  1 cl .  a t  i ( i  �� 
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in the criticism of l aw. J ustice is the segment of moral ity primarily concerned 
with the ways in which classes of individuals are treated. Principles of j ustice do 
not exhaust the idea of moral ity, however, and thus H art attempts to provide 
a general characterization of m oral rules or principles .  
Two d i fficulties arise .  First, moral terms are open-texturedY' Second .  
there is  wide disagreement about the s tatus o f  moral pri n c i pl e s .6--l N o n e ­
theless ,  H art argues that there are " four c ard i n al features"  common t o  rules 
or principles termed "moral" :  i mp ortance,  i mmu n i ty fro m  d e liberate 
c h an ge ,  voluntary character of moral offe nses ,  and for m s  o f  m oral 
pressure .65 These features are the 1 1ecessary formal criteri a  of c..n y  moral 
rule or pri nciple . They shape the wide sense of morality to w h i c h  H art 
adheres.  I n  additi o n ,  they are purportedly  "neutral "  betwee n  rival p h i lo­
sophical theories as to the status of moral rules and princip l e s .  Li ke H obbes 
and H ume , H art recognizes that there is a considerable overlap between 
moral ity and l aw, o f  which h e  also ado p ts a "wide" defi ni ti o n . 
H art's general clai m  is that there is no necessary connecti o n  between 
morality and l aw. H e  acknowledges,  however, that there i s  an i mportant 
connecti o n  betwee n  them, albeit  weaker .  To that e xten t, h is  c o m m itm e n t  to 
legal positiv ism i s  not to a b l i n d l y  formal ist  accoun t .  I n  w h at H art c al ls the 
"pre-legal world , "  the d istinction between moral ity and l aw is o ften blurred .  
T h e  transiti o n  to the ''legal world , "  primaril y  e ffected thro u g h  the i n tro­
duction of secondary rules,  makes the di sti nction "somethi n g  d e fi n ite . ' 'I)G 
Accord i n g  to H art, not all nonlegal rules are moral rul e s .  Rules of 
e tiquette . for e xampl e ,  are not moral . Some n o n legal rules,  h o we ver, h ave 
"supre m e  i mportance - these are" moral rules 67 Very often there wi l l  be at 
leas t  a " p artial ov'=rlap" between moral and l egal rules .  The p articular 
obl igations recognized in any given legal world varv as its moral code varies .  
Yet, g iven certain features of h u man beings and the world i n  which they 
l ive , the social moralities coexisting alo n gside l egal worlds " al wa y s  i nclude 
certain obl igations and duties ,  requiring the s acrifice of private i nc l i n ation 
or i n terest"6H essential to i ts survival .  A mong rules necessary for social l i fe 
' ' are those forbidding,  or at l e ast restricti ng,  the free use o f  viole nce , rules 
requir ing certain forms of honesty and truthfu!ness i n  deal i n gs wi th others,  
[and] rules forbidding the destruction o f  tangible thi ngs o r  their  seizure 
from others . "6;1 
I n  short, moral ity and l aw share a common commitment both to 
surv ival and to securing at least a mi n imum of protection for h u man l i fe .  
This ,  i n  turn,  e x pl ai ns their  l argely c o m mon \'Ocabularv . 70 B o th moralitv 
6 3 .  ! d .  a t  1 64 .  
64 . ! d .  
65 .  ! d .  a t  1 69-/6 
66 . ! d .  at 1 6 5 .  
6 "7  I .  ! d .  at 1 66 .  
68 . ! d .  
69. !d .  at  1 6/ .  
70. !d.  at 1 68 .  
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a n d  law accept a n d  incorporate "the m i n i m u m  content of  Natural  Law . '' 7 1  
H an argues that ,  given certain "truisms" abo u t  h u m a n  b e i n gs and their 
world ,  "there are certa i n  rules of conduct w h ic h  any social orga n i zation 
must contain i f  i t  is  to be viable ."72  Four of  the "s imple truisms" or 
u n iversally recogn i zed principles of conduct reveal H an's concept ion of 
h u man nature : h u m a n  vulnerabil ity,  approximate equality,  l i mi ted a l tru­
ism, and l i m i ted u nderstanding and strength of w i l l .  The fifth one is  a fact 
about the world : that there are l i m i ted resources . 73 
H an's truisms combine a Hobbesian characterization of h um a n  nature 
with a H u mean acco u n t  of why social conve n tions are necessary . Accordi n g  
t o  t h i s  v iew,  moral i ty and l a w  should have a certain content because these 
truisms apply to h uman beings i n  their world.  Any legal system that does 
not  i ncorporate the m in i m u m  con te n t  of natural law cannot " forward the 
m i n i m u m  purpose of survival which men have in associat ing with one 
another. ' ''.; In i ts absence, H art states : 
[Mlen as they are , would have no reason for obeying voluntarily 
any rules ;  and without a m i n i m u m  of cooperation given volu n ­
tarilv b y  those w h o  find that i t  is  i n  their i nterest t o  submit  t o  a n d  
maintain t h e  rules,  coercion of others w h o  would n o t  vol u n taril y  
conform w o u l d  be i mpossible 75 
H art e m phasizes the social character of j u stice , which pres u pposes a 
fram e work of rules p ubl ic lv recognized as regulative of cooperation and a 
host of public expectations that cannot be met outside such a framework. 
Like H obbes,  he  explains the genesis of j ustice and j ust ifies its  conti n uity  bv 
referring to certai n basic features of human n ature and to certa i n  pre­
sumed pri mary social needs.  Most im portantly ,  however, only p u blic 
recognition and widespread acceptance o f  the value of i nst itutions of j ustice 
for organized social l i fe can make these i n st i tutions stable and rel iable .  I f  
people were not convinced that the cont i n ued existence o f  these i n s ti tut ions 
is for their good , and the common good , then they would not  be effective . 
H an's reply to the Aust inian thesis that the l aw may have an_Y content i s  a n  
argu ment from t h e  m oral i ty o f  · 'natural  necessity . "76 To describe ade­
quateiv the law and other social insti tutions ,  H an contends,  one m us t  m ake 
roo m  for statemerns whose truth is ''con tingent upon h uman b e i n gs and 
the world thev l i \'e in retaining the salient characteristics which they 
ha\·e . " 7 �  Tl:e content requirements of H an's argument leave o p e n  the 
poss ibi l i ty that laws may be u nj ust or i mmoral in the broad sense of  j us tice 
or moral i ty .  In H art's \'ie\\' , n arrow defi n it ions of e i ther morality or law 
"iead us to exclude certain rules e\'en though they exhibit  al l  the complex 
I I .  ! d .  ( l ( 1 09 .  
7 :2. .  ! d .  at  l KS .  
1 3 .  1 d .  :t! 1 90-93 . 
74 .  ! d .  :t l  1 89 .  
I :J . I d .  
7 6 .  l cl a r.  EI.J .  
I / .  ! d .  
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characteristics"78 of morality or law, thus complicating and obscuring the 
study of these social phenomena.79 The use of narrow concepts "would 
force us to divide in a very unrealistic manner elements in a social structure 
which function in an identical manner in the lives of those who live bv i t."Ro 
It is  at best candid to suppose that the adoption of narrow concepts "is l ikely 
to lead to a s tiffening of resistance to evil, in the face of threats of organized 
power, or a clearer real ization of what is morally at stake when obedience 
is demanded."8 1 The law can be, and often has been, an i nstrument for 
those who manage to secure enough cooperation from some to dominate 
others.82 
Unlike Hobbes, Hart maintains that "to make men clear s ighted in 
confronting the official abuse of power,"83 as well as in confronting the 
social abuse of appeals to morality, it is important to "preserve the sense 
that the certification of something as legally valid [or moral! y good] is not 
conclusive of the question of obedience."8.J The sense that one can appeal 
to "something outside the official system" ultimately to settle the issue of 
obedience "is surely more likely to be kept alive among those who think that 
rules of law may be iniquitous, than among those who think that nothing 
iniquitous can anywhere have the status of law."·�5 Thus , Hart believes that 
laws are made, not discovered. Among other things , laws are made to 
protect interests,  to distribute social benefits and burdens, and to secure 
peaceful, cooperative social life. That they have often fallen short of these 
goals is a reason for cri ticism, rather than for claiming that thev are not 
reallv law. 
I 
In principle, the minimum content of natural law is compatible both 
with gross violations of human beings' prima facie entitlement to equal 
treatment and with the maxim that differential treatment requires special 
forms of justification. For Hart, that neither law nor accepted social 
morality need extend minimal protection and benefits to all persons wi thin 
their scope are "painful facts of human history."86 
b. Natural law in the positi·oe law 
v\'e can now apply the t\VO-interpretation analysis to the second part of 
the reciprocal containment thes i s :  that the natural law is contained in the 
civil law. The contractarian interpretation does not help to make the thesis 
intelligibl e. It seems empirically false that all commonwealths incorporate 
laws for peace, the surrender of the right of nature, and the performance 
7H.  lei . at 20.3.  
79 . I d  
8 0 .  l ei .  at 1 7 7 .  
8 1 .  ! d .  at  2 0 .3 .  
8 :2 .  !d.  at 2 0 :"5-06 
8:1. l ei .  a t  206. 
84. lei . 
8 .3 .  I d .  
86.  ! d .  at  1 96.  
FORAJALISivl AND CORRECTIVE J US TICE 7 2 7  
of contract. The contractarian meaning certainly cannot explain what the 
second part of the thesis would mean in commonwealths by acquisition. 
Gregory Kavka tries to unpack the second part of the reciprocal 
containment thesis by suggesting that it might involve either a weak or a 
strong claim. The strong claim runs counter to Hobbes' legal positivism and 
to his unyielding belief in the ultimate, absolute authoritv of the common­
wealth's so\·ereign. The sovereign could very well repudiate the laws of 
nature without the subjects being able to protest. The weak claim is that the 
sovereign or its agents must intnpret the laws of nature. These laws are "not 
fully developed until embodied in civil law."�" I n  other words, the weak 
claim asserts that the laws of nature "are to be presumptively regarded as 
part of the civil law of any State even without explicit enunciation or 
enactment."�s But the first disjunct runs into the same problem as the 
strong claim : the sovereign has the power to interpret the laws of nature in 
any wav it sees fit. Moreover, the second disj unct at most could mean that, 
before enactment, the laws of nature have the status of rational guides for 
their sovereign's legislative activity . Ascribing such a status to laws of nature 
would not explain - without falling prey to circularity-why the laws of 
nature should be normative constraints on legislation. 
Kavka believes that Hobbesian philosophv is in a better position than 
Hobbes to support the strong claim that natural law "is contained in the 
civil law of all satisfactory States."S'I If ' 'satisfactory states" are defined as 
those commonwealths with rational sovereigns, Hobbes would agree that 
the natural law is contained in the civil law of all satisfactory states. I n  these 
commonwealths the interpretation problem does not arise because the 
rational sovereign's legislative authority is consistent with the laws of 
nature. The laws of nature are ' ·contained in" the civil law of such 
commonweal ths in the sense that they are incorporated in it . The theorems 
of moral philosophy are part of law properly so-called. 
The definition of ci\·il law Hobbes offered is not whollv content­
neutral .  I f  content considerations constrain what is to count as law, then not 
even interpretation of the laws of nature is correct. At least two conditions 
m ust be met for the i nterpretation of the laws of nature to be "correct." 
First, the rational sovereign must see itself as constrained bv the laws of 
nature. Second, the rational sovereign's interpretation of the laws of nature 
must secure the peace and prosperity of the subjects of the commonwealth . 
. \Jorality promotes persons' rational self-interest, notably their fundamental 
interests in social peace, security of their persons, and comfortable living. 
To the extent thar in commonwealths with rational sovereigns the laws of 
narure impose content requirements on law, there is a congruence between 
moralitv and law. 
This implication of Hobbes· view is limited, hoh·ever, bv his assertion 
that the laws of nature are contained in the civil law in all commonwealths 
of the world. A fortiori , they would be contained in the civil Ia w of 
:) 7 .  Ka,·ka. su pra note 4 5 .  at 249.  
8 � .  l ei .  
S 9 .  ! d .  at 2 5 0 .  
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commonwealths with irrational sovereigns. By "irrational sovereign," we 
mean a sovereign who acts against peace and the prosperitv of its subjects .  
Hobbes simply assumed that sovereigns are rational (or should be pre­
sumed rational by adjudicators) , and thereby mystified law as a product of 
rationality. 
2. De-mystifica tion a n d  Re-m_)·stifica tion 
As we have shown,  Hobbes' positivism has formalist elements. Strictly 
defi ned, all law issues from a sovereign with authority to enforce 
compliance.90 Legal justice is nothing but the formal, logical application of 
positive law. The Hobbesi an laws of nature are articles of peace that reason 
suggests, whereby individuals may come to an agreement to order societv in 
a state of peace. These · 'articles of peace' '  are only improperly termed 
"laws. "  This thick positivism is the progenitor of Bentham's imperative 
theory of law and of Austin's influential statement of legal positi\ism.�' 1 
Hobbes' positivism de-mystified the law to the extent that it broadened the 
traditional natural law definition of law to include e\en iniquitous rules set 
in place by human powers. 
But his rationalistic formalism mystifies sovereignty and, through 
sovereignty,  civil law. Hobbes' understanding of positi\·e civil law as a 
product of sovereignty (and yet) reciprocally contained i n  natural law 
infuses his legal theory with a quality of normative nwstery contemporar;· 
legal realists and pragmati sts are quick to discredit . This quality seems to 
spring from the idiosyncratic character of Hobbes' legal theory. L' nl ike 
orthodox natural law theorists on the one hand and strict positivists on the 
other, Hobbes gave an important role to the laws of nature while arguing 
that, ultimately , the meaning of law and justice can be elucidated onlv b\· 
reference to a constituted state . 
D. Distributive Law a n d  Justice 
I .  Distributive Laws vs. Penal Laws 
Hobbes divided law into two broad categories. natural an d positiveY� 
The natural laws are those which have been laws for all eternitv. These are 
not only "natural ,"  but also "moral"  laws , consisting in moral vi�tues such as 
justice, equity, and all habits of mind conducive r o  peace. Positive Ia \'' · on 
the other hand, is law made "bv the will of those that ha\ e had the SO\ ereign 
power over others ; and are either written , or made known to men ,  bv so1�1e 
other argument of the will of the legislator. ' ' fi :J 
90.  Hart,  supra note 58, at 1 2 6 ( " 'Th e  1 ice known tn legal rhenn as formal i sm c H  
concepru al ism consists i n  an  attitude to ,·erbalh furmubted wlcs ,,·h ich both seeks w di .sguN: 
<.l!ld to min imize the need for . . .  choice [ i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of general rules  to part icular  c.lscs ! .  
once the general rule has been la id  c!o"· n . " ) .  
9 1 .  john Aust in . 2 Lectures on J ur isprudence or t h e  P h i losopl11  of Posit i1·e  La,,· r Rn bcrt 
Campbel l  eel . ,  5 t h  ed. 1 9 1 1 )  ( 1 87 3 ) ;  J eremY B e nt ha m .  The Li m i ts of J urisprudence Defi n ed 
1 3 9 (Charles v\'arren El-erett ed . . 19,1 5 ! .  
92. Hobbes, supra note 1 7 . at 2 1  I .  
9 :3 .  Icl. at 2 1 2 .  
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Positive laws,  H obbes wrote ,  a r e  e i ther d istributive or p e n a l .  D i s trib­
utive laws are those that determ i n e  the rights o f  s u bjects,  "declaring to 
e \ ery man what i t  i s  by which he acqui reth and holdeth a propriety in l a n d s ,  
or goods,  and a r i g h t  o r  l i berty o f  actio n ;  these s p e a k  t o  a l l  subjects . "9-± B y  
con trast ,  ' ' pe n al " l a w s  a r e  those " w h i c h  declare,  w h a t  p e n a l ty shal l  be 
i n flicted on those that v iolate the law; and speak to che m i ni sters and 
o fficers ordained for execu tio n . "'"' I f  the posi tive law i nc l u des tort l a w ,  then 
tort law would ap pear to be,  i n  H obbes' v iew,  d istributive,  and the rules of 
j u stice i t  establishes are rules  of d i stribut ive j ustice.  I nsofar as they are 
d i rected at cit izens rather than offic ia ls ,  the l aws of propenv , contract, and 
substa n t i \·e cri m i nal  l aws are also d i strib u ti ve laws i n  H obbes' sense.  
H obbes' d i sti nction between d is trib u tive a nd p e n a l  laws does not 
correspond to Aristotle's rea l m s  o f  distributive a n d  corrective j ustice.  For 
H obbe s ,  d istrib u tive posit ive laws would seem to i nclude the laws of 
correct i\·e j ustice i nsofar as they are addressed to subjects rather than 
offic ia ls .  A ga i n ,  accord i n g  to H obbes, " [ D ] i stributive are those that d eter­
mine the rights of the s u bjects,  declaring to every man what it i s ,  by which 
he acq u i reth a n d  holdeth propriety in lands ,  or goods,  a n d  a r ight or l iberty 
o f  actio n . "96 A right or l i be rt y  o f  action could i nclude a right to brin g  a 
c la im for damages ,  s ince o n e  o f  the means b y  which one "acqu i reth and 
holdeth a propriety i n  lands,  or goods"'1 7  is  as a consequence o f  a successful  
d a m age actio n . Tort law i s  a l so , i n  this  sense,  d i stribut ive .  Penal  laws are 
addressed to " m i n i sters a n d  o fficers" and declare "what penalty shal l  be 
i n fl icted o n  those that v iolate the laws. "''8 H obbes seemed to mean by 
distributi\·e positi ve law a l l  o f  the " prim arv rules of obl igation" ( i n  H art's 
sense) addressed to cit izens .  
B y  defi n it ion , d i stribut i \·e positi \ e laws estab l i s h  n orms al l ocati n g  
goods and l iberties a m o n g  me mbers o f  society.  C a l l  t h e m  "al location rules . "  
Do al location rules enta i l  rules that mainta in  d istribut ive a rran gements?  
A re "allocatio n  maintenance" rules  logical ly or practical lv  requ i red to 
d ictate procedures to fol lo w  when there i s .  as there i nevitably i s ,  w i l l fu l  or 
acci d e n tal  deviation from the i nit ia l  pattern of d i stribut ion se lected for i ts 
abi l i ty to secure peace : The Aristote l i an analysis  o f  j u stice s u ggests that 
al location maintenance rules are logically req u i red by a system o f  h u m a n  
al locat i o n .  
H obbes' l egal theory s uggests that a l location mai ntenance r u l e s  are a 
practica l ,  b u t  ethical lv contingent,  feature o f  a j u st system o f  lega l  rules .  I n  
theory , occasions o f  privately complai ned o f  or official ly noticed deviat ions 
from a n  opti m a l  distribu t i o n  -A bat Lers B ;  C converts D's  property;  E 
m i s m a n u factures Fs a u to m obil e - co u l d  be viewed as occas ions  for 
fon\·ard -looking meas ures that woulc! deter fu ture i nj u rious conduct ,  
i m prove safet)· . mora l l ;' educate,  or encou rage i nsurance.  The· could also 
9-l.  I c!. 
9 5 .  I d .  
9G. ! d .  a t  212 .  
9 7 .  ! d .  
98.  l ei .  a t  2 1 2 .  
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b e  viewed, fol lowing Aristotle o r  K a n t ,  as  occas ions for backward-looki n g  
measures such as repara t i o n  or p u n is h m e n t .  
H obbes was  openly h o s t i l e  t o  backward-looking responses  t o  ' · p a.st  
evi l ."  He posited as h i s  seventh l a w  of nature that p u relv \ engefu l  or 
retributive res ponses to evi l  are n ever just ified .99 Proper p u n i ti ve responses 
a im at a good to be gained,  such as rehabi l i tation ("correction of t h e  
offender") or deterrence ("direction o f  others") rather t k m  a loss t o  b e  
restored or a gain t o  b e  disgorged . 1 00 I f, as  a descrip tive m atter,  A merican 
personal i nj ury law has focused o n  backward-looking,  corrective j u s t ice . i t  i s  
not because of logic  a lone.  
H obbes did not dist inguish d i s tributive laws that  a l locate from corn ­
plementary distributive laws that function to maintain al locat i o n s  b\ 
mandating rectificati on . I ndeed , H obbes had l i ttle to say about the detai ls  
of the "corrective" dimensions  of di stribut ive law . H i s  theo1T c a n  be 
i n terpreted as leavin g  maxi m u m  d iscretion to the sovereign in choosing a 
corrective j ustice system.  A sovereign could enrtct reg u l ati o n s  ai med at  
i n creas ing safety and deterri n g  w i ll fu l  i nj ur y  b u t  providi n g  n o  l e g a l  r e m ech 
for individual  i nstances of i njury .  A sovereign could decide to u-e�1 t some o r  
a l l  human-ca used i n terference w i t h  a n  i n it ial  a l location a:; cri m e s .  a\\·ard i n g  
no monetary damages t o  t h e  vict im b u t  p u n i s h i n g  t h e  i nj urer.  V i ct i m s ,  i f  
paid, coul d  be paid from publ ic  fu nds or p rivate funds : t h e  private fu nds 
could belong to the injurer or not .  Something other than rnonev,  such as an 
a pology , could be awarded the vict im .  The so\ ereign could deci d e  to treat 
some or all h u m an-caused in terference with in i t ia l  allocat ions  as tort . hu:  
award damages from p u b l i c  fu nds or private i n s u rance fun ds .  
2 .  Com muta tive justice Z 'S .  Distrib utiz 'P justice 
For Aristotle,  j ustice is a v irt u e ,  a n d  l i ke other vin_ues , a mean bei \1Tcn 
two extremes . 1 0 1  J ustice,  the chief and most com prehe n s i \e of all  \ i rt u e s .  
implies obedience to l a w  a n d  fairness to others .  1 ' 1� J ustice ::t s  Ll i n1e:-;s 
s ignifies takin g  no more than one's s h are o f  the good thi ngs and a t  least 
one's s hare of the bad . 1 o:> J ust ice as conformitY to law s i g n i fies  obedience to 
norms whose aim is the happiness  o f  the socia l  and pol i t ical  com m u n i n . 1 ' H  
The realms o f  the unj u st and the u n fair a re not  perfec th · cr> I t gr u e n t :  
e\·enthing u n fair i s  u nlawfu l ,  b u t  n o t  e\·ery t h i n g  u n la \1 fu ! i s  u n fa i r . 1 n.-. \·er 
' j u stice exists only between men whose m utual  relat i o ns are goYerncd lw 
law; and l aw exists for men between whom there is  i n ju s tic
.
e .  For !egai  
j ustice is the d i scrimination of the j u st and u nj u s t .  . \\·e do n ot a l l o ll' a il'!'r:n 
to rul e ,  but  rational  pri n c i p l e  . " 1 06 
99. Id .  ar 1 1 9 .  
1 oo _  t el .  
1 0 1  . .-'nistotlc, su pra note 3 ,  at 1 1 8 .  
! 0� - lei .  a t  1 0/ 
! (): ) ! d .  at 1 2  J .  
! 04 .  l ei _  at  l O S .  
! OS .  l d .  at 1 16.  
! 0 6  !d .  at  1 22 - 2 3 .  
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Aristotle distinguished between distributive justice - fairness in 
distribu tion - and rectificatory or corrective justice. 1 07  Distribut ive justice 
concerns the proper apportionment or allocation of goods such as wealth or 
honors. 1 °K Aristotle allowed that a just apportionment m ay be equal or 
unequal, in accordance with principles such as merit, need, desert, or 
entitlement. Recti fica tory justice concerns both voluntary transactions, such 
as sales. consensually initiated b;· the parties, and involuntary transactions ,  
such as theft , which is  clandestine and nonconsensual.1 09 A fter a voluntary 
or involuntarv transaction that offends the rectificatory ideal of j ustice the 
judge tries to take away the offenders' gain and restore equilibrium. 1 1 0 
According to _-\ristotle, in s uch a situation, 
[ I ] t  makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a b ad 
man or a bad man a good one, or whether it is a good or a bad 
man that has committed adultery, the law looks only to the 
distinctive ch aracter of the injury, and treats the parties as equals 
if one inf1icted inj ury a n d  the other has received it .  Therefore, thi s  
kind of i njustice being a n  inequalitv, the judge tries t o  equalize it ; 
for in the case also in which one has received and the other has 
inf1icted a wound , or one has slain and the other been slain, one 
suffering and one action have been equally distributed ; but no 
judge tries to eq ua lize things bv means of one penalty taking away 
the gain (or pain) of the assailant . 1 1 1 
Aristotle understood that his u se of the terms · ·gain" and "loss" in connection 
with innJluntarv noncommercial transactions is metaphorical. 1 1 2 
Bv contrast , for Hobbe s ,  law may be penal or distributive in its 
function whiie justice may be commutative or distributive. For H obbes, 
commutati\·e j us tice is the branch of corrective justice identified by Aristotle 
as irwoh·ing voluntary tra n sactions. 1 1 :1 Commutative justice, described by 
H obbes as  arithmetical, requires the performance of a contract. It consists 
of equalitv in the thing for w hich the contract has been m ade. Distributive 
jus tice is geometrical. I t  e ntails equal benefi t  for equal merit. When Hobbes 
described laws as distribu tive,  he was referring to their fun ction. When he 
described justice as distrib u tive, he was referring to a quality a law must 
have in order to accord w i th a natural standard. 
Hobbes plainly in tended distributive justice to include Aristotle's 
conception of both im olu ntary corrective justice and distributi\·e justice. 
Less clear is Hobbes' i nt e n t  in departing from the dis tinction between 
arithmetical j us t ice a n d  g eometrical j us tice he found in other writers. H e  
clearly saw error in 
this disctinction. in t he s e n se wherein it u seth to be expounded . .  
1 0 7 .  ! d .  at 1 1 2- 1 7 . 
1 Oi L  I d .  a t  1 1 7-20 
1 09.  I cL  at  1 1 7 .  ! 2 0 .  
1 l ( 1 .  ! d .  Jt J 1 5 .  
l l ! .  :\ r is tut le .  supra n u t e  3 .  a t  ! t .:t - J :) 
i 1 2 . i d .  at  t 2 ! .  l 2 'l .  
! U .  .-\ ri s totle , su pra note 3 .  at t t l  
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. .  T o  s p e a k  properl y ,  commutative j ustice,  is  t h e  j ust ice ,  of a 
contractor ; that i s ,  a performance o f  covenant ,  i n  b u y in g ,  and 
sel l i n g ;  hir ing,  and letti n g  to h ire ; lending,  and borrowin g :  
exchanging,  bartering,  and other acts of  contract. 
And d istributive j ustice, the j ustice of an arbitrator ; that i s  to say , 
the act of defi n i n g  what is j ust .  \\'here i n ,  being trusted b y  them 
that m a ke him arbitrator, i f  h e  perform his  trust,  h e  is  said to 
d istribute to e\·ery m a n  h is own : and this  is indeed j u s t  d istribu-
tion , and may be called , though i mproperly,  d istribu t i \·e  j ustice ; 
but more properly equity ; w h i c h  also i s  a Ia\\· of n ature . . . . 1 1 � 
H obbes rej ected Ari stotle's notion that d istribmi\·e j ust ice can be based 
on any standard of "merit . " 1 1 '' D istributive j ustice,  Hobbes said, is  really 
equitable d istribution . I t  must be based on an arbi trator's j udgment of 
equity.  I n  contrast, Aristotle believed that principles of distr ibut ive j ustice 
match i ndiYiduals w i th their desert s .  To H obbes, howe\·er,  such reward for 
merit is a matter of "grace," not  j u s ti ce . 1 1 6 
I I .  Co'>TD!PORARY Qu:sTtO'>S ,  H oB B ES ! .-\'>  A'-."S\\TRS 
Our elaboration of the legal phi losophy of the Leviathan re\ eals a 
p h i losophy that i s  consistent with the abandonment  of corrective j u stice as 
the fou ndation for tort law. I ndeed,  i t  is  cons istent with the abandonm e n t  
of tort l a w  itse l f. S u c h  an a ppreciation of  t h e  H obbesian perspective can 
help contemporary Ari stotel ians a n d  their  cr it ics  frame the n ature of  the 
norm ative "tort theory" enterprise . 
Lately ,  this enterprise has most o ften begun w i th e fforts to s h ow the 
moral ity or m oral consistency of  existing personal  i n j ury bw . C u rrent tort 
theory often takes moral assessment of  the permiss ib i l i ty or necess itv of 
strict, no-fault  l iabi l i ty as i ts cen tral chal lenge.  To contemporan tort 
theori sts,  Aristotle's appeal l ies i n  h i s  prO\ is ion of a formal ,  analyt ic  
d istinction which , when combined with substantive E n l ig h te n ment values 
of equal ity or equal r ights,  a p pears to generate an obl igation of  i n di\ · iduals 
and/or society to a n n u l  losses .  Aristotle pro\· ides an analysis that p u r ports to 
distinguish sharply annul l i n g  losses from p u n is h i ng wro n gs and d istribut­
ing resources fairlv . 
A. H obbes ian perspecti\·e ,  w h i c h  assu mes human equality but colla pses 
distributive and relevant di mensions of correcti\'e j ustice,  asks c o n te m po­
rary theorists to reth i n k  common normative ass u m ptions about a n n ul l i n g  
losses i n  response t o  t h e  i nequal ity result ing from ,  or \·io l a t i o n  of righ ts 
i m pl ied by,  victi m - i nj urer relationshi ps .  I t  asks us to rethi n k  whether 
i n d iv iduals have a moral  duty to a n n ul losses,  or a reason to a11 nu l losses in 
addit ion to subm itting to p un i s h m e n t ;  whether a \1'01·kable gove rn me n t  
m u s t  have i nstitutions of corrective justice dist inct from i n st i tu t ions of  
distri b u tive or retributive j ustice ; whether,  t\ en i f  protecc ing equal i tv or 
equal rights is their ai m ,  corrective i n s t i tu t ions rn ust h a v e  t b e  pri\·ate,  
1 1 -l .  H obbe s ,  supra n o t e  1 7 , at  1 1  n .  
1 1 5 .  !d . :  ,-\;-istotle.  su pra note 3 ,  at  1 1 :! (" [A] '''ards should b e  ·according to meri 1 ·  ' ' 1 .  
1 1 6 .  Hobbes,  supra n o t e  1 7 , a t  l i 8 .  
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bilateral, transactional character of current American tort law ; and whether 
a regime of correction can be a regime of justice if it must - or may - ignore 
distributional concerns. 
The Hobbesian perspective asks us to rethink the connection between 
corrective justice and formalism. Hobbes' theory presents an "immanent 
rationalitv" formalism that rejects kev aspects of Aristotle's anal:-sis. In 
doing so, it  challenges vVeinrib's assertion that Aristotle ' 'sets out the 
justificatory structures to which any coherent legal arrangement must 
conform."1 1 7  It is by no means self-evident that, or in what sense, Hobbes' 
distinction between distributive and commutative justice is less "coherent" 
than Aristotle's distinction between distributive and corrective justice. 
In addition, reading Hobbes in light of current corrective justice 
debates suggests the importance of two specific tasks. First, reading Hobbes 
suggests the i mportance of asking certain questions that are not being asked 
today ,  chiefly , "who is formalism? " It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss the social context of the Lel'iathan .  Understanding the context of 
formalism, however, may provide surprising instructions about where to 
look for insights into the direction of current theory. 
Second, reading Hobbes suggests the need for expanding the range of 
philosophical questions that are asked about personal injury cases . The 
question, "are fault-based liability and strict liability morally consistent and 
justifiable�" is an important one. Obsession with that question, however, 
has come artificiallv to constrict discussion about morally appropriate 
responses to personal injun. Certainly, Hobbes' list of nineteen moral laws 
or virtues is quaint. But it, like similar lists in Aristotle's ethics, stands as a 
reminder of the richness of moral thinking and discourse. 
Hobbes was not abO\e moral reductionism. Indeed, he believed that 
the collecti\·e demand of h i s  nineteen moral virtues could be summed up in 
one - the negative Golden Rule. Even if, as Hobbes thought, all of the 
moral ,·irtues could be incorporated ·in a single i mperative, there would 
arguablv be a great deal to say about  the the morality of particular features 
of American personal injury law. Yet there has been a striking tendencv 
among philosophers to prefer more reductive to less reductive modes of 
analvsis. 
A. . Who Is Formalism 'i' 
On �,;larch 8 and 9 ,  1 99 1 ,  the University of Iowa College of Law 
sponsored a conference entitled "Corrective Justice and Formalism. " The 
brochure for the conference stated its goals in broad terms. It would 
examine the moral dimensions of an important area of law. Conferees were 
to elaborate theoretical perspectives on ''the care one owes to one's 
neighbors. " 1 �: -; The academics who presented papers at the conference were 
asked to focus their comments on the contributions of two scholars, 
Professor Ernst Weinrib of t h e  Liniversitv of Toronto and Professor Jules 
1 1 7 .  \\"einrib, s upra note -! ,  a t  4 L 1 .  
1 1 8 .  Broch ure,  C:orrecti' e J ustice and Formalis m .  Symposium of the Iowa Col lege of La" 
(on fi le  ,,·ith the Iowa Lm Re,· ie"· i .  
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Coleman of Yale U niversity,  to the gro w i n g  l i terature o n  tort theory . 
Weinri b and Coleman were paired because,  to a s i g n i fi c a n t  extent,  they 
view tort l aw as a reflection of corrective ideals of j ust ice and as h a v i ng 
moral fou ndations not  whol ly  reducible to economic i nstr umental i sm.  
Profe ssors 'Weinr ib  and Coleman both attended the c o n fere n c e .  Thev 
l abored h ard for two sol id days to present the ir  latest r e flect ions  on l e g�l 
theory and to respond with care to the serious p apers a n d  quest ions 
i nt roduced for discuss ion .  \'\'i th c haracterist ic i ntel l i g e n c e ,  warmt h ,  and 
h u m i li t v ,  \Ye i n ri b  sought  to  defend h i s  formal ist  concep t i o n  of corrective 
j ustice . 
\:\'e inrib's rem arks brought the fol l o w i n g  odd-so u n d i n g  quest ion to 
m i n d :  who is form alis m :  That i s ,  what  k ind o f  person is l i kely to advance 
legal forma l i s m :  \·Vho finds  formal ism plausible or credible?  Who finds  
solace i n  formal ism's  man date for r icher and richer art i c u l at ion of strictures 
corHained in th e l a w ?  \Ne u n derstand these to be quest ions  about the 
ps'. chologv and sociology of legal theory . 
The ·\dw is formal ism" q u est ion emerged as an u ne x p ected response 
w a cert a i n  stvle of p h i losophical argum e n t  Weinrib em ployed in defe nd i n g  
his  formal i s m .  \\.ei nrib asserted that "we law�·ers know t h a t  c a usation i s  not 
the same t h i n g  as market deterr ence,"  an
-
d that "we lawyers know that  
adjudicat i o n  is  not legis lat ion ." These assertions seemed to resonate with 
marw i n  his  audience .  The conference audience consisted,  in  part ,  of 
s ign ifican t ly  l i ke-mi nded p h i losophers without strong a ffi ni ties  e i ther to 
. . lai': and economics" or "crit ical l e gal  studies . "  Yet both l i ke - m i nded a n d  
hostile l i steners cou l d  pote n t i a l l y  appreciate t h e  psychologica l  and socio­
logical  l i m itations of argum e n ts that appeal , even i n  the res pected names of 
"ref1eeti\ e equi l ibri u m "  a n d  "paradigm case i ntuit io n i s m , "  to the priv i leged 
"we " of ' 'LL'I' !acuyers knocL' · · . 
Some w ho sar  in \Ne i n rib's  a u d ience may have been w a i t i n g  to be 
pe rs u aded of p reciseh the assert i o ns he elected to ass u m e  as true .  As the 
"!a,,· is pol i tics" sl ogan of the critical l egal s tu dies move m e nt attests ,  1 1 9 m a n y  
law\·ers '''Oldd disagree t h a t  adj u dication i s  relevantly d i fferent from 
legis lat ion.  One does not  have to be a left-wi n ger, however,  to be ske ptical 
of the dist i nction between adj udication and legislation .  The e x perience of 
teaching· jur isprudence t.o American law students a nd u n dergraduates 
s ugge sts that some students, by v i rtue of their race , c las: , g e nder, sexual  
ori e n tat ion or c! isabil i tv,  arri ve at  law school already b e l i eY i n g  that j udges 
engage. sometimes for better, typical ly  for worse, in m a ki n g  law ( legisla­
t ion) rather than fi n d i n g  law (adj u dication) .  For these i nd i v i du a l s ,  formal­
i sm can look l i ke a n  elaborate for m  of se lf-decept ion , the arguments used 
t o  defend i t  a ppearing obscure , circular,  and self-sen· i n g .  
At the  I c)\\·a conference,  Professor W e i n r i b  descri bed formal ists a s  
argu i n g  about the  req uire m e n ts of l a w  i n  a n o n-vicious c ircle w ith a "wide 
a rc. " Formalists reason from what they expl ic i tly  believe a b o u t  the law tL' 
i·:hat the'  i rnplic i rh bel ieve about th e law, he explained.  A formal is t  begi ns 
wit h expl ic it  b ." , probes i ts p resupposi tions  to reveal i mp l i c i t  la\v ,  and then 
l i C )  Ser gl'l;em//y The Pol i t ics of L;n,· (D<l\ id Kains eel . ,  1990) 
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p robes further sti l l  t o  reveal t h e  deepest presu pposit ions of l a w .  Weinrib 
argues that the deepest probe reaches to the conceptions o f  H egelian 
abstract r ight ,  Kantian rig h t ,  o r  n atural r ights i m m a ne n tlv contained within 
t h e  law.  
S u p pose two i n t er preters of the Fourtee n t h  Amendment,  for i n stance 
ChiefJustice Reh n q u i s t  and j u stice B la c km u n ,  begin \vi t h  i ts express terms.  
The:·  both fi nd the ideal of ordered l ibenv ; but then,  at a st i l l  deeper level  
the:· fi nd the opposing " l a w , "  one d i scoveri n g  that abort ion c hoice i s  
women's fu ndamental  r ight ,  t h e  othe r  disco\ e ri n g  that i t  i s  not. 1 20 'vVh o  i s  
correct�  Which posit ion i s  most defensible)  T ru e ?  Formal i s m  claims to be 
consistent with the fact of earnest expert disa greement .  A good deal  of 
atten t io n  has gone to debati n g  whether that  particular c la im of formal ism 
can be sustained . 1 2 1  We a re not here,  however, i n terested i n  assessi n g  
formalism as a theon i n  the usual  w a v .  Rather, we are i merested i n  \vh o  c a n  
be a formal ist  a n d  \�· hether o n l v  ce;tai n  k i nds o f  i nd i viduals  w i l l  f in d  t h e  
p roject and method s  o f  formalism a p pea l i n g .  
Formalism i s  sometimes \·iewed as i n h eren tlv co nservat i v e .  I ndeed , i t  
i n s tructs those who reason about law and decide l e ga l  cases to look to 
establis hed positive or n a t u ral  norms .  \! embers of poli tica l l y  powerl ess,  
d i sach amagecl groups w h o  can not accept that there could be legit imate 
legal barriers to em powerment and welfare mav be i ncl ined to b a l k  at 
pos it i\ · ist ic  fonn al ism . .. "\ccustomed to the cri t ic ism that form a l i s m  i m pedes 
reform . \\' e inrib argued at t h e  I owa conference that precisely because his 
theon is  purelv formal , i t  should not worr v  or i m pede reformers.  If tort 
reformers want the law to do good t h in gs ,  thev can work toward the 
enactment o f  law that wil l  d o  good things .  Weinrib's  only reservation about 
such a project deri\·es fro m his  beli e f  that the good thi ngs legal reformers 
have typical ly  done in the last one h un dred years , in resp o n d i n g  to the 
a d m i tted l i m i tat ions of the common law, have not been consi stent  with the 
principles o f  corrective j ust ice that m a ke tOrt law i tself cohere n t .  
W e i n rib's  p u tati\·e l y  reassuring response,  t h a t  reformers may work 
toward the e n actm e n t  of better law, is  not actu a l l y or equallv reass u ri n g  to 
neryon e . I t  m a\· be re ass u r i n g  to t hose who bel ie\·e that they or t h e i r  
re presentati \ es ha\ e the p o w e r  t o  bri n g  a b o u t  substant ive legis lat ive 
reform . I t  may be reassuri n g  to those who bel ieve that the req u ire m e nt s  of 
u a tu ral law or polit ical  m oral ity are contained in the positive law, await ing 
discovery bv a sym pathetic j ud i ciary . 
W h y  was formal ism appeali n g  to H obbe s ?  A good deal  i s  known about 
his l i fe and his  beliefs . 1 �2 Born in 1 58 8 ,  H obbes 
fou n d  himself  in a coun trv w h ere peace and secu r i ty were 
constantly in jeopardv becaus e of the demands for l i berty and a 
greater s hare of govern ment by the grow i n g  class of traders, 
1 �I) (j.  Tilumburgh ' . .  \mcri c;.J l l  College < J f  O b s t ctrici d i i S  and C \llecol ogists .  47() L' .S .  
; 4 7 .  IS:, t i < ;�6)  ( \\'hite.  J .  clissc m i ng) .  
I '2 1 .  Cj. Ronald lh·orki n ,  La1\'s E mpire ( l �lK l i )  
i :t2 .  \ l i ri ;un Reik.  The Golden Lands of Thomas H < >hbcs ( 1 9 7 7 ); George Robertson , 
Hobbes (Scl :o larh Press 1 9 7 0 )  ( I  f) l li ) :  A rn o l d  Rngow. Thomas H obbes .-\ Radical in the 
Sen· ice uf Reanion ( 198b) .  
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professional  men,  and yeomen farmers who rated the a uthoritv of 
the B ible and of their own consciences abO\·e that o f  the magis­
trates,  bishops , and counsellors of the k i n g . 1 2:l 
H obbes p articularly desp ised the a uthoritv of organ ized rel igion . He a lmost 
lost his l i fe for his  bel iefs .  H obbes'  brand of formal ism fac i litated a 
theoretical defense of supreme secular a uthority . Secul a r  a uthorin is as 
u nassai lable as church authority i f  the natural law i s  c o n tai ned in the 
positive law and the positive law i s  contained i n  the n a tural  la\1· .  H obbes 
hoped his formal ism would catch o n ,  e n d i n g  the polit ical  c haos of his t ime,  
unit ing the citizens o f  E ngland by show i n g  that  rational i tv ,  prudence,  
rel igion ,  and moral i ty required that a l l  submit  equal ly  to the wi l l  o f  an 
absolu te ,  i n d ivis ible,  sovereign commonweal th .  
I n  the U n ited States and s i m ilar  western nat ions ,  manv people seem to 
believe that the positive law has a special  relat ionship to religi o u s .  mora l .  or 
humanistic values ; that they are largely congruent .  \Ve s u ggest .  howe1 e r ,  
that l e g a l  formalism wi l l  not be a p p eal i n g  t o  those who h a 1  e co m e  t o  doubt 
that specia l ,  congruent re lationship .  Nor wi l l  i t  ha1 e a p pe a l  to those '·1· ho 
doubt that they can win critical l v  i m portant legislati1·e and j udicial  battles 
for reform .  None of this i s  intewled to prove that forma l i s m  is  theore tical lv  
u ntenable .  vVe only  o ffer for consideration the thought that  form alists in  a 
pluralistic society that i nc l udes m argin a l i zed gro ups h<n e a harde: rhe tur­
ical  job than their argu m e nt s  would seem to indicate that thev kno\1· . 
B. Is the Cho ice Betwee n  Fault and Strict Lia bllit_y the Oni-..; C�ucsiion ?  
Corrective and distributive rationales coexist in American law.  F<� u lt­
based and strict- l iabi l i ty co-exist as well ,  and are often defended bv a p peal  
to corrective and distributive rationales ,  respecti1 elv . Recogni z i n g  th i s .  
J ules Coleman assigned t o  legal phi losophers t h e  task o f  d ecid i n g  "whether 
any moral principle or consiste n t  set  o f  such princi ples  can aciequatelv 
explain and . . .  j ust ify both fau l t  and strict l iabi l i ty ' T !-I 
For Hobbes , the im port a n c e  of Coleman's  question 1muld l :�n e been 
twofo l d .  The question wou ld h aYe been an import a n t  one for m oral 
scienti sts e n gaged i n  pure researc h  and for j u rists charged w i t h  i nt erpret i n g  
the l a w .  The c iv i l  law contains the n atural  l aw - the moral  1·inues . . J uris ts 
charged with i nterpre t i n g  the posit ive law should ha1·e right reason 11· i r h  
respect t o  moral l a w .  
For H obbes , t h e  n a tu ra l  l a w  is  a moral ity o f  peace . Conduct  i s  good o r  
bad i n  relation t o  \vhether i t  prom otes or im pairs peace.  H obbes .  11' ! 10 
rej ected Aristotle's theorv o f  corrective j ustice for im·o l u n tan trans;:;ct i o n s ,  
d i d  n o t  directly address t h e  choice between fault  a n d  s tri c t  l iab i l i t 1· o r  
whether t h e  t w o  are moral lv  consistent .  H obbesian moral i tv n e 1  enhe less 
' 
suggests several very d i fferent responses to Cole m a n ' s  que�tion . I t  i s  
1 � 3 .  H obbe s .  su pra note 1 7 . a r  7 .  
1 24 .  In \!oral Theor ies of Torr s :  Pans I a n d  II, su pra note 1 0 . C o l e m a 1� �t> s u nw <  th; tt  t < > rl 
Ia"· is a mural!,· s ign ificant p h e n o m e n o n .  H e  also seems to assume t h a t  C \ i s t t n g  ton ] ; 1 \,· , i t :  
fact .  i m poses l iabi l i t,. some t i mes on t h e  basis of moral fau l t .  C i ,·en t h e  a p p licu J r n •  o f  t !bjn:r i ,·e 
standards of i ntent in  i n temional torts and reasonableness in negl ige nce. i t  i s  nut ob, i o u �  : hat 
tun Ia"· i s  go1·erned at  all b1 pri nciples of moral fau l t .  
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consistent with the broad outlines o f  Hobbes' theory t o  suppose that no 
private law civil tort remedies are morally required by natural justice. 
Equity , pardon, and forward-looking retribution are moral virtues under 
Hobbes' natural ethic. Arguablv ,  rational persons in a state of nature would 
agree to submit to the authority of a sovereign who collected taxes for a 
social insurance svstem that compensated all victims of accidental injury. 
A utilitarian's a n tipathy to purely backward-looking private law re­
spon ses to int entio nai  and accident al injury is also consisten t  with the broad 
outlines of Hobbes' moral thought. An aggressively forward-looki n g  Hob­
besian moralist m i ght co nclude that the fault principle is an i ndefensible 
limitation on liabilit\ for injury where goods presumably conducive to 
peace, such ;is safetv and efficien t  risk-spreading, can be achieved through 
a mix of fault-based and strict liabilin·. 
Another res ponse ,,·o uld find an argument for fault-based liability in 
the natural Ia \\' agai nst pride. Hobbes described pride as the failure to 
acknowledge others as natural l v  equal to o neself. It is Kant's version of this 
idea that grounds vVeinrib's defenses of the fault principle in traditional 
tort law. 
A further response wo uld find in the equity and anti-pride laws of 
nature an argument for a no-fault tort scheme. The most secure peace may 
depend upon \ictim-oriented responses to injury that do n o t  discriminate 
against \·ictims on the basis o f  moral assessmen t  of an i ndividual injurer's 
state of mind. Accordi ng to Coleman, "moral philosophers largely have 
i gnored the question o f '' ho should bear a loss when no candidate for it is 
at fault . " 1 � -, Coleman asserts that moral philosophers "have stopped con­
tributing to the dialogue at the verv point where their contributio n is 
needed m ost . ' ' I � , ;  
The i m po rtant  q uestion of the consistency and justifiability of the 
fault-based and s t rict liabilitv tendencies of contemporary tort law can 
o\·erpower ocher I m porta nt questions. Consider the following intentio nal 
tort case. ; �7 A four-\ ear-old boY, Salvatore D'Angelo , intent ionally battered 
his  teenage babysi tter, breaking both her arms. She sued in tort. According 
to Coleman's theorY , correctiYe just ice will impose a prima facie duty on the 
agent, little Sah ·atore , that gi,es him a reason for acting to annul the loss 
occasio ned bv his wrongdoing. He may be excused from such a duty 
because of his age . For now, \l'e will ignore the problematic nature of 
speaking about the moral reasons small children - or other mental incom­
petents liable for intentional torts at common law - haYe for actin g. The 
implicit attribution of mo ral responsibility here is provisional. 
Societv·s ton system, in the name of corrective justice, may impose 
priYate l iabilitY on Sah·awre as the mode of rectificatio n. Does i t  have to ;:, A 
public respo nse to pri1 ate in jurv is a contingen t  requirement in Hobbes' 
,· i ew ,  existing only to the extent peace requires. Colem an, however, 
1 � 5 .  \!arkc t s .  \ ! orals Zt l ld  the Lt" . su pra note 1 0 ,  at 1 8 3 .  
1 �6 .  !d .  
1 :? 7 .  The fact pat t<:-rn ,., h i c h  fol l ohs i s  based on E l l i s  \ ' .  D'Angelo.  1 1 6 Cal .  App 2d 3 1 0 
( 1 9 5 5 )  (holcli11g i l{:H a ch i ld  of four ma\· he held liable for intenti'onal tons) .  
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apparently believes that j ustice requires a public response to i n tent ionally 
caused personal i nj ury, non-contingently.  Yet the existence of moral right
.
s 
and d u ties of corrective j ustice does n o t  e ntail that the state ought to do 
anyth i n g  in response to the " fact" that a particular v ict im experiences a loss 
and an inj urer has a duty to that victi m .  Arguably , the state must e n force 
the moral "rights" of vict ims .  States,  however, do n o t  e n force all  of our 
moral  rights . I t  i s  not  ob\·ious that  a just  state would be less just  i f  i t  
employed noncorrecti\·e ,  nonrelational modes of responding to i njury .  
Tort theorists are  obliged to provide an underst a n d i n g  of the moral 
argum e n t  from i n d ividual moral rights to morally obligatory public i n s ti ­
tutions protecting those rights.  
While some would say that corrective j ustice requ i res  that the s i tter be 
paid out of Salvatore's (or his  insurance company's)  pocke t ,  Coleman would 
e n tertai n ,  in our view properl y ,  the possibi l i ty that  some nonton distribu­
t;ve mechanism could justly compensate the sitter. Coleman would proba­
bly agree that a just  socie ty may conclude that Salvatore is  not  a morallv 
culpable age n t  and thus im pose no legal l iabi l i ty .  Can a j ust  society 
recognize that Sah atore is morallv i n n ocent and stil l  hold him l iable in 
i n te n tional tort bv  a p peal to the "two i n nocents" m a x i m ? 1 :?8 The two 
i nnocents maxim prm·ides that as between two innocent parties,  loss should 
ult ima tely fall on the party who i nst igated or caused the i n j urv . Legal 
l iabil ity premised on the two i n nocents maxim is n o t  b arred b y  Coleman's  
mixed conception of corrective j ustice.  H owever, Coleman would stress that  
application of the maxim is  not  the application of corrective j ustice if  
Salvatore is in nocent rather than a wrongdoer. In  so far as tort law relies  
upon the two i n nocents max i m ,  the j ustice of tort law i s  d is tribut ional .  I n  
two in nocents cases i nvolv ing children and the i ns a n e ,  the argument i s  
often made that i m posing l iabi l i tv o n  a n  inco mpetent  wi l l  encourage 
responsible adult caretakers with an economic i nterest in the defe nd a n t's 
estate to take precautions again s t  i nj ury . 
1 2 8 .  Sa . e g ,  Polmat icr  ' .  Russ .  5 3 7  A . 2d 468 (Conn.  1 988)  ( h ol d i n g  insane person l iable 
for i n te ntional  tort . a n d  stating "\\·here one o f  t\\'o i n nocent person s  m ust s u ffer loss from an 
act done,  it i s  just  that  i t  should fal l  on t h e  one \\'ho caused t h e  loss rather than on t h e  other 
who had n o  agenC\ i n  produc i n g  i t  a n d  could not  ha\ e a\oidcd i t " ) ; Losee , . .  B uc h a n a n ,  5 1  
:\ . Y .  476 ( i 8 / 3 ) (holding t here \\·as n o  l iab i l i tY w i thout fau l t  for i nj ur ies caused ll\ paper m i l l  
explos ion,  and t here ,,·as no app l ication i n  c a s e  l i ke t h i s  of r u l e  t h a t  "where one o f  t w u  i n n ocent  
part ies must  s u ffer. h e  \d10 puts  i n  motion the cause o f  injurv m ust  bear the loss " ) :  B re u n i g  
\ . American Fam i l \  I n s .  C o  . . 1 73 :\ . \\- . 2 d  fi l 9 ( W i s .  1 9 7 0 )  (declaring no l iabi l i tY  " i t ho ut fau l t  
for i nj unes caused b v  s u d d e n l y  i n s a n e  person a n d  fi n d i n g  t h a t  p o l i o· basis for h o l d i n g  
perman e n t!v i n s a n e  persons l iable for t h e i r  torts includes · · [  w ] here o n e  o f  t\\·o i nnocent 
persons m u s t  suffer a loss i t  s!wuld be borne b\ t h e  one who occas ioned i t " \ ;  jol lc\  ' .  Pm,· e l l ,  
299 S o .  2d 647 ( Fla .  D i s t .  C t .  A p p .  1 974) ,  ccrl. drn 1ed , 3 U 9  So.  2 cl 7 ( F l a .  1 9 / :S \  ( fi n d i n g  r hat  
insanity  of m a n  \\·ho shot another under b i z � u-re c i rc u mstances docs n o t  just ih exception to 
reasonable man standard and stat iEg ""· here one of t\\·o i n nocen t  persons must  s u ffer a loss ,  
i t  should be borne b'  the one who occas ioned i 1 ' ' ) ;  c/ Becker ' ·  I n terstate Propert ies .  569 F . 2cl 
1 2 03 ( 3 d  C i r. 1 97 7 )  (holding real estate de\ eloper l iabl e  for n egligence o f  u n clcrcap i t ,dized 
sub-contractor) ; E l l i s , . .  D'Angelo,  1 1 6 CaL App. 2d 3 1 U  (1 955 1 ( fi n d i n g  that c h i l d  of four rna\ 
be held l iable for intent ional  torrs explai n i n g  that  " i t  i s j us t  that  t h e  loss  should fall o n  t h e  estate 
of t h e  \\Tongdocr rather than on that o f  a gui l t less person,  and that ''  i t h o u t  reference to the 
question o f  mor�d gui l t" ) .  
T h e  cases abm c arc a d i ,·crsc s a m p l i n g  of cases c i t ing t h e  i n f1 u c n t i a l  max 1 1 n .  Each case 
appears i n  W .  Page Keeton ct  a! . .  Tort and .l,ccidcnt  La\\· ( 1 98 9 ) .  
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I t  i s  general ly assumed that corrective j ustice or corrective and 
d istributive j ustice together exhaust the moral  foundations of personal 
i nj ur y  l a w .  This  assu m ption i s  not clearly  warranted.  :\'! oral ly  s peaking, 
from a perspective that emphasizes responsibi l i ty ,  one could argue that 
Salva tore's pare n ts ought to be l iable for his  i ntentional i nj uries because 
they are his parents .  We do not propose to defend this view,  but a moral 
perspective that regards certa in  fam i l y  members as co-responsible is  not on 
its  face i m plausible .  The exist ing common law rule  officially l i mits parental 
responsibi l i ty to i nstances in  which the parents had reason to know of their 
chi ld 's  dangerous procl ivit ies .  B u t  whr should pare ntal l i a b i l i ty be so 
l i mi ted?  The move away from the patriarchal legal rules that formerlv 
treated h usbands and w i \·es as a s ingle entitv,  did not foreclose a ne11· 
mora l i ty and law of fam i l ial  responsibi l i tv .  
Even without  a morality of fam i li a l  responsi b i l i ty , one could argue that 
non-negl igent parents should help to pav for the s i tter's inj ur y .  A morallv 
decent thing to do might be for the parents to offer to pav at least half of 
the s i t ter's medical costs . It would be a way of express ing grat itude.  I t  would 
acknowledge that i t  was out of a mutual ly beneficial arran gement ("con­
tract") for services t hat the injury to the s itter occurred . The i m pl ausib i l i tv 
of the argument that the s itter's wages reflected her r isks ,  makes the 
loss-sharing a rgument verv attractive from a moral point of \ iew.  
Should tort law sometimes require sharing losses i n  the name of  
decency, or gratitu d e ;;  Are there sui gcnnis moral relationships  or ad hoc 
moral obl igations that j ustifv legal l i abi l i ty on some occas ions?  Should tort 
law require moral v irtue of parties in s i tuations in which co rrenive  and 
distributive j ustice would not  cal l  for l iabi l i tv)  Do such s i tuat ions exist: Do 
existi ng tort rules,  such as the rule that l i mits  parental l iabil itv or the rule 
against "bad Samaritan " l iabi l i ty,  re flect rejection by positive la\1· of H obbes· 
moral v irtues - his natu ral laws - as legal requirements ;; Can traditional 
rules concei\ ed by phi losophers i n  corrective j u s t ice or distributi ve j ustice 
terms be reconcei\'ed in  terms of moral \'irtues::- Can thev be reconci led \\· ith 
moral v irtues ? 
Such questions warrant explorati o n ,  alongside the question of the 
moral i ty of strict l iabi l i ty that has become a staple of mainstream tort 
theon. To date,  the small  number of p h i losophers \\'ho ha\·e tu rned their 
attention to tort law and to questions of l iabi l i ty i n  the absence o f  fau l t  lw\ e 
been remarkabh· l i ke-mincled about the kind of moral reflection they deem 
relevant to the tort law . I t  is  no s m a l l  acco m p l ishment,  in connection with 
personal inj u ry law, to i l lumi nate,  as seYeral theorists have, the moral 
requirements of equal i ty,  of m o ral rights,  and of reciproci tY .  B ut,  \\'e 
conclude, i t  1vi l l  be important to go broader as we go deeper. 
